LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources
Volume 3
Issue 1 Fall 2014
11-1-2014

Making Cost-Benefit a Political Tool
Roger Meiners
Rafal Czajkowski

Repository Citation
Roger Meiners and Rafal Czajkowski, Making Cost-Benefit a Political Tool, 3 LSU J. of Energy L. &
Resources (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol3/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor
of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Making Cost-Benefit a Political Tool
Roger Meiners*
Rafal Czajkowski∗
INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis seems like a stodgy topic for those other
than practitioners imbued in the technical aspects of such
calculations. But in recent years, it has become an important tool to
justify certain regulatory goals. Regulations are often suspected of
dragging down economic activity. However, if it can be shown that
careful analysis of a new policy shows greater wealth after its
adoption, the regulation is easier to justify and more difficult for its
opponents to dismiss. As reviewed in this Article, cost-benefit
analysis is now actively employed to justify an array of costly
regulations. Achieving this requires the adoption of assumptions
that are dubious on economic grounds. The parties who developed
the analysis being employed are not engaged in subterfuge; the
entire process is above board. Rather, this Article argues that the
process itself is deeply flawed.
This Article examines the cost-benefit analysis process as now
generally employed, with a focus on environmental regulations.
The Article begins with a nuts-and-bolts overview showing that
cost-benefit analysis requires careful work and transparency in
assumptions made so that the analysis can stand up to critical
review. Then, the Article looks at how the process has been
modified in the recent years to take into account values not
traditionally employed, particularly by assigning a value to prevent
CO2 emissions. Finally, the Article argues that the result of the
modification of the traditional analysis has given agencies the
ability to set the benefits such that any rule involving reduced
energy use can be easily justified, thereby making the exercise
nearly meaningless. Goals that have political and social values are
given a gloss of scientific legitimacy by asserting the legitimacy of
contrived numbers in cost-benefit analysis.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Executive Orders Requiring Cost-Benefit
Presidents have imposed cost-benefit analysis requirements on
federal agencies for decades. For instance, President Ford required
agencies to produce “inflation impact statements” for proposed
major rules.1 Similarly, President Carter ordered agencies to
prepare analyses of the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches
for major rules.2 However, the current framework generally traces
to President Reagan who required agencies, except for independent
regulatory agencies, to produce studies when benefits exceeded
costs and perform these studies for all rules likely to result in an
impact on the economy greater than $100 million per year.3
In 1993, President Clinton revoked Reagan’s order, but
imposed a replacement requiring quantification of costs and
benefits and consideration of qualitative measures.4 Again, rules
imposing a cost of $100 million a year or more were subject to the
requirement, as well as certain other situations, particularly where
conflicts between agencies were created by new rules or where
“novel legal or policy issues” arose from a mandate.5 For
significant regulatory actions, agencies must provide the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), an “assessment of the potential
costs and benefits of the regulatory action.”6
To assist in applying the new requirement, in 1996 OIRA
issued, via an interagency group, a document outlining “best
practices” when preparing analyses.7 This document was replaced
in 2003 by OMB Circular A-4 in the Bush Administration, which
similarly instructed agencies on the analysis expected by OIRA
under Executive Order 12866.8 To comply with Circular A-4,
agencies must explain the problem the regulations are to address,
the actions being taken, alternatives considered, and evaluations of
1. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, § 1, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501, 41,501 (Nov. 29,
1974).
2. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,663 (Mar. 24,
1978).
3. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
5. Id. at 51,738.
6. Id. at 51,741.
7. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (1996).
8. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OMB CIRCULAR A-4, (2003).
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quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits.9 Finally, under the
Obama administration in 2010, the OMB refined Circular A-4.10 In
2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13563,11 which is
similar to earlier orders because it instructs regulators to propose
and adopt rules upon a determination that the benefits justify the
costs and to select approaches that maximize net benefits.12
B. EPA Cost-Benefit Analysis
Section 812 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA)
shows the complexities involved in a cost-benefit (C-B) analysis.13
It requires the EPA to periodically reassess costs and benefits of
the rules implemented under the Clean Air Act.14 Assessments
involve a series of studies and subsequent interpretation of the
results of the studies.15 The EPA is obligated to consult a review
committee composed of outside experts (the Council).16 To date,
the EPA has released three Section 812 reports that provide
insights into the steps the EPA employs in C-B analysis
preparation.17
The first report, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act:
1970 to 1990, commonly known as the Retrospective Study, was
completed in 1997.18 The study evaluated costs and benefits of the
9. Id.
10. This included, in 2010, a checklist for regulatory impact analysis. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA
Checklist.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G8JR-XDL6.
11. Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). See also Exec.
Order 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011) (supplementing Exec. Order
13,563 and encouraging independent agencies to use similar methodology).
Various statutes have been enacted over time that come into play. See, e.g.,
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47) (imposing environmental
impact studies on all major federal actions that impact the human environment
and applying to independent regulatory agencies, unlike EO 13563).
12. Compare 76 Fed. Reg. at 3,821 with 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.
13. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/, archived at http://perma.cc/SZ6R-2EY2 (last
updated Aug. 15, 2013).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 1-14 (2011) [hereinafter BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO
2020], available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/fullreport_rev_a.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/6RTD-3JCH.
17. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13.
18. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT, 1970 TO 1990 (1997).
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regulatory requirements of the 1970 Act and subsequent 1977
Amendments up to the 1990 CAAA. The report concluded that,
from 1970 to 1990, the benefits of the Clean Air Act exceeded the
costs by a factor ranging from 10 to 100.19 The second report, The
Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1990 to 2010, commonly
referred to as the First Prospective Study, was published in 1999.20
It estimated costs and benefits of the implementation of the 1990
CAAA through 2010 and concluded that the benefits of the
Amendments exceeded costs by a factor of four.21 The third report,
The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020,
also known as the Second Prospective Study, was finalized in
April 2011.22 In this report, the benefits of the 1990 CAAA were
estimated to exceed the costs by a factor of more than 30 to 1.23
The report also provides an overview of the timeline of the studies
and the general impact on emissions, actual or presumed, under the
statutes, compared to the level of emissions that would have
existed in the absence of the regulatory regime.24
Over the years, the EPA developed regulatory impact analyses
(RIAs) to evaluate potential social costs and benefits of proposals
to individual regulation, including costs and benefits that
traditionally cannot be quantified and expressed in monetary
terms.25 The Second Prospective Study, which assesses health,
19. Benefits over the 20-year period were estimated to be between $6 and
$50 trillion; the costs were $523 billion. Retrospective Study - Study Design and
Summary of Results, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanairact
benefits/design.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P675-TSRC (last updated Aug.
15, 2014).
20. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2010 (1999),
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/chap1130.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/7XDR-EYWK.
21. Id. at iii. Benefits were estimated to be $110 billion; costs about $27
billion.
22. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16.
23. Later in the paper we discuss the generation of this amazing increase in
benefits.
24. See BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-3, Figure 11, Clean Air Act Section 812 Scenarios: Conceptual Schematic, (The “withCAAA” scenario tracks compliance with 1990 CAAA rules through September
2005. The “without-CAAA” scenario freezes emissions controls at the 1990
levels, allowing for changes in population and economic activity.). See also
James H. Wilson et al., Emission Projections for the Clean Air Act Second
Section 812 Prospective Analysis, 58 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASSOC. 657, 663
(2008).
25. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS
AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND RECONSTRUCTED POWER
PLANTS 1-3 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/111
dproposalRIAfinal0602.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MRC9-KGSQ.
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welfare, ecological, and economic benefits resulting from the 1990
CAAA programs alone, represents a broader C-B analytical
framework.26 Rather than review all three analyses, this Article
focuses only on the Second Prospective Study’s analysis to give an
overview of the C-B process. Possible shortcomings will be noted
during the discussion of the analysis, but it is used to illustrate a
carefully constructed work.
II. C-B ANALYSIS IN THE SECOND PROSPECTIVE STUDY
The Second Prospective Study created two scenarios: one with
Clean Air Act Amendments (with-CAAA) and one without Clean
Air Act Amendments (without-CAAA).27 The baseline scenario is
with-CAAA, which assumes all federal, state, and local air
pollution controls are fully implemented.28 This baseline scenario
is subsequently juxtaposed against the counterfactual withoutCAAA scenario, in which air pollutant standards remain at 1990
levels.29 Oddly, in its reliance on the population estimates provided
by the Census Bureau,30 the analysis assumes identical geographic
population and economic activity distributions for both scenarios.31
A review of the steps needed to complete the C-B analysis in the
Second Prospective Study are summarized in Figure 1-2 of the
report. 32
A. Modeling Air Pollutant Emissions
The first step in the analytical sequence is to model emissions
of the major air pollutants.33 This model tracks the changes in the
26. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-5.
27. Id. at 1-6.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 1-7.
31. It is dubious to assume that some health-concerned residents would not
leave the areas with continuously declining air quality; hence, to assume that
economic activity in most polluted areas would remain constant is doubtful.
Professor Revesz helped put to bed the notion that jurisdictions might fall into a
race to the environmental bottom in an effort to attract industry. See generally
Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race to
the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulations, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210 (1992). Nevertheless, for analysts to assume some migration from
more polluted areas would be a major undertaking that could also be criticized.
32. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-8, Figure 1-2,
Analytic Sequence For The Second Prospective Analysis.
33. Id. at 2-1. Emissions analysis is focused on six major pollutants
regulated by the 1990 CAAA: volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen
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level of emissions over time in both with-CAAA and withoutCAAA scenarios.34 A three-step model was deemed suitable for all
major source categories, except electricity-generating units
(EGUs):
1. Construction of emissions inventory to serve as a base for
the projections;
2. Projection of emissions for the without-CAAA scenario for
three target years (2000, 2010, 2020); and
3. Construction of the with-CAAA estimates for the same three
target years under the same set of economic activity
projections.35
Emissions for EGUs were estimated with the help of the Integrated
Planning Model36 via special optimization procedure.37
Both scenarios, with-CAAA and without-CAAA, have distinct
base years.38 The year 1990 was selected as the base year for the
without-CAAA scenario, based on the logic that this scenario
should effectively restrict pollution controls to the 1990 level.39 On
the other hand, given that the with-CAAA scenario was designed
to estimate the impact of compliance with the CAAA over time,
the base year should allow for tracking of emissions since 1990
and take into account decisions made to comply with the CAAA;
hence, the year 2000 was selected.40
In modeling the air pollutant emissions, a general approach was
adopted. Emission factors41 were multiplied by the level of the

oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter
(PM10) and fine particulate matter (PM2.5).
34. Id. at 2-2. Projections were made for five major source categories:
electricity generating units (EGUs), non-EGU industrial sources, on-road motor
vehicles, other non-on-road engines/vehicles, and the last, smallest category, of
area sources.
35. This part assumes regulatory stringency and timing consistent with
EPA’s CAAA implementation plan as of late 2005. Id. at 1-7.
36. Id. at 2-3 (the process was developed by ICF Consulting for EPA).
37. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 2-3. This
procedure takes into consideration additional factors such as costs of electricity
generation, costs of pollution controls, external projections of electricity
demand, and pollution control methods.
38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Id. at 2-3.
40. It was less problematic to apply two distinct base years instead of basing
projections on recent emissions and subsequently trying to simulate effects of
removing CAAA emission controls in place. Id.
41. Derived from base year emissions estimates.
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activity42 generating emissions. A major challenge that required
much deeper consideration was the projection of economic
growth,43 which entered the model in three instances:
1. Forecast of electricity demand;
2. Forecast of fuel consumption for non-utility sectors; and
3. Projections of economic growth serving as activity drivers.44
To model economic growth45 in both scenarios, an approach46 was
adopted that took into account energy demand, fuel price
projections, and other factors for each of the five source categories
required by the CAAA.47
B. Estimation of Costs
Compliance with the CAAA is expensive. The cost affects all
levels of the economy, including industrial production, research
and development, and capital investments.48 Also, there are costs
associated with forfeited productivity, employment, and
consumption, which arise from devoting resources to comply with
the regulations. Nevertheless, the main focus of the Second
Prospective Study is to estimate direct (annual) compliance costs,
which can be attributed specifically to the 1990 CAAA.49 Cost
analysis in the Second Prospective Study is driven by the results of
the emission-reduction analysis, in which the authors modeled the
42. Emission generating activities vary by source category and generally are
related to economic activity (e.g., transportation, energy consumption, industrial
output, and others). THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 2-5.
43. Id. at 2-5. See Annual Energy Review 2005, DEP’T OF ENERGY 9 (July
27, 2006), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038405.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8HQJ-DZC9. That data provided the basis for
growth projections used by EPA.
44. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 2-5.
45. Id. The Annual Energy Review applied in the analysis predates the 2008
economic downturn, so it is likely that emission estimates were innocently
overstated in both scenarios.
46. For the purpose of implementing this integrated approach, a selection was
made to apply the Department of Energy National Energy Modeling System
(NEMS), typically used to produce the DOE’s Annual Energy Review projections.
See The National Energy Modeling System: An Overview, DEP’T OF ENERGY
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8G
KN-VTBM (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
47. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16. Table 2-4, Base
Year Emission Data Sources For The With- And Without-CAAA Scenarios
(presenting a full list of CAAA programs modeled for each source category).
48. Id. at 3-1. A five percent discount rate was applied to annualize costs of
capital expenditure over the estimated life of equipment necessary to reduce
emissions. Id. at 3-6.
49. Id. at 3-2.
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CAAA compliance costs for the three target years by comparing
respective costs of air pollution reductions in both scenarios.50
The Second Prospective Study identifies two cost-estimating
methods:51
1. Cost Estimates Based on Unit Costs;52
2. Cost Estimates Based on Optimization.53
In addition to the general cost estimation methods, the EPA Project
Team took into consideration supplementary cost-saving factors
such as “learning by doing.”54 Hence, when deemed plausible, the
analysts applied additional cost-saving adjustments based on
previous empirical evidence.55 Finally, all cost estimates in the
Second Prospective Study are expressed as the total annualized
costs, meaning these costs include all of the costs of operation,
maintenance, and, if applicable, capital investments.56
C. Air Quality Modeling
Air quality modeling links changes in emissions to changes in
the atmospheric concentrations of the pollutants. The focus is on
what is achieved in both scenarios by estimating impact emissions
on ambient concentrations of ozone, Particulate Matter, PM10 and
PM2.5, acid deposition, and visibility for each of the target years.57
To simulate physical and chemical processes governing the
formation, transport, and deposition of gaseous and particulate
species, EPA analysts relied on the Community Multi-scale Air
50. Id. Except for few instances in which direct costs are derived
concurrently with pollutant emission reductions. Id. at 3-3.
51. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 3-1. See also id.
at Table 3-1 at 3-5 (summarizing cost estimation methods applied to each source
category and organized by major rules within each category).
52. Id. at 3-3. This method estimates costs by collecting information on the
costs associated with specific control measures required by CAAA regulations.
53. Id. In this approach costs were estimated concurrently with emissions
through a cost-minimizing algorithm with specified emissions’ reduction targets.
In this approach, costs were estimated concurrently with emissions through a
cost-minimizing algorithm with specified emissions’ reduction targets.
54. Id. at 3-4. Literature suggests that cost per unit of production, when
using a given technology, declines as experience with that technology increases
over time. See Dennis Epple et al., Organizational Learning Curves: A Method
for Investigating Intra-plant Transfer of Knowledge Acquired Through Learning
by Doing, 2 ORG. SCI. 58, 58–59 (1991).
55. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 3-6. The Council
recommended applying a default-learning rate of five to ten percent to sectors
for which no empirical data are available. Id. at n.22.
56. Id. at 3-6.
57. Id. at 4-2.
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Quality (CMAQ) model.58 This model allows for the determination
of the magnitude, temporal variation, and spatial distribution of the
ozone and particulate concentrations in the atmosphere, along with
the timing and distributions to the earth’s surface.59 The CMAQ
model is critical to the Prospective Study because the outputs
derived from the CMAQ Model form the foundation upon which
ecological and health benefits are calculated.60
D. Economic Valuation of Human Health
In terms of the health-benefits analysis, the EPA’s standard
practice is to calibrate CMAQ results and not use them directly.61
Development and application of the calibration factors is done
either with the use of the Modeled Attainment Test Software
(MATS)62 or by applying an inverse distance squared weighting
procedure called Enhanced Voronoi Neighbor Averaging
(EVNA).63
In the next step of the analytical sequence, the Second
Prospective Study applies various models to estimate the expected
reduction in the rates of adverse health occurrences that serve as a

58. Id. Emissions data are processed as input to the CMAQ using the SparseMatrix Operator Kernel Emissions (SMOKE) processing system. See Marc R.
Houyoux et al., EPA’s New Emissions Modeling Framework, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei14/session11/houyoux.pdf
archived at http://perma.cc/NN2R-KRQY (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). For a more
recent overview, see EPA, Research in Action: Community Multi-scale Air Quality
Model (CMAQ), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/AMD /Research
/RIA/cmaq.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H3J3-UPRL (last updated June 30,
2014).
59. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 4-5.
60. Id. at 4-3. The CMAQ model was applied to produce twenty-one
simulations with pollutants of interest including ozone and fine particulate
matter (PM2.5).
61. Id. This process is called “monitor and model relative adjustment,”
which is a calibration procedure sometimes applied to correct for inconsistencies
in the CMAQ output. Here, the adjustment was applied to correct for
inaccuracies in fine particulate matter emission estimates. Id. at 4-7.
62. See Abt Associates, Modeled Attainment Test Software User’s Manual
(June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/scram001/guidance/guide/MATS-2-3-1_man
ual.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CLL6-CRQW. To see the effect of the
MATS procedure, see BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 4-9
to 4-10, Tables 4-3 and 4-4.
63. Guidance on the Use of Models and Other Analyses in Attainment
Demonstrations for the 8-hour Ozone NAAQS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 20 (Oct.
2005), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67873, archived at http://perma
.cc/BB5C-WQT8.
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base for deriving the economic impact on health.64 The Second
Prospective Study focuses primarily on health benefits65 attributed
to the improved air quality.66 The valuation analysis is comprised
of a sequence of linked analytical models67 designed to estimate
health benefits. It involves three key steps:
1. Estimating exposure of individuals to air pollutants;68
2. Estimating human response to exposure; and
3. Valuing avoided human health risk.69
A central tool of the health-benefits analysis is the
Environmental Benefits Mapping and Analysis Program
(BenMAP), developed and maintained by the EPA’s Office of Air
and Radiation.70 BenMAP accepts a range of air quality inputs and
is widely regarded as a tool capable of performing a quality
exposure analysis.71 The inputs loaded to BenMAP include:72
1. Forecast changes in air quality from the without-CAAA to
the with-CAAA scenarios for all three target years 2000, 2010,
and 2020;

64. The analysis applies nationally representative age-specific incidence
rates obtained from CDC and National Center for Health Statistics and
American Lung Association. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra
note 16, at 5-5.
65. Id. at 5-1. Health benefits are typically expressed as avoided cases of air
pollution related health effects, such as premature mortality, heart disease and
respiratory illness.
66. Id. at 5-6. Focus is on human health effects associated with reduced
exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and ozone, as these are the largest
contributors to the overall health benefits estimates. For the summary of the
Human Health Effects of ozone and PM2.5. See also id. at Table 5-1.
67. Id. at 5-1. Models include forecasts of implementation activities under
the 1990 CAAA, estimates of the pollutant emissions, and modeling of the air
quality or both scenarios.
68. Exposure measures used in epidemiological studies used to derive
human response are typically based on outdoor exposure. BenMAP (discussed
immediately below) incorporates 2000 U.S. Census Bureau block-group
population data to determine specific population potentially affected by ozone
and PM2.5.
69. Valuation is accomplished by application of estimates from the
literature to characterize unit values per illness incident avoided. BENEFITS AND
COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 5-2.
70. Id. See also BenMAP User’s Manual and Appendices, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Sept. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/dec09/BenMAPappend
icesSept08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KP3L-TDAD.
71. Exposure analysis includes calibration of model results to monitor data
for historical years, assessing the changes in health effects’ incidence resulting
from those exposures, and estimating monetized value of those avoided health
effects. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 5-2.
72. Id. at 5-3.
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2. Health impact functions that quantify the relationship
between the forecasted changes in exposure and expected
changes in adverse health effects; 73 and
3. Health valuation functions that assign a monetary value to
changes in specific health effects.74
The output from BenMAP results in central estimates, distribution
of the incidence of health effects, and valuation at the national and
county level for each of the three target years of analysis. 75
E. Aggregations of Results
Aggregation of the results over the entire 30-year period
involved interpolating the benefit values, which would be realized
in the years between the target years (2000, 2010, and 2020) by
matching a trend in the emission reductions for PM precursors76
and subsequently discounting the stream of monetized benefits to
the 1990 value with a five percent discount rate.77 Consistency in
the approach applied to both scenarios (with-CAAA and withoutCAAA) for all three target years allowed a direct comparison of
the monetized benefits to the estimated costs in the C-B analysis.78

73. Id. at 5-4. Health impact functions estimate the change in health
endpoint of interest (e.g., hospital admissions) for a given change in ambient
pollutant concentration. Typical function will have four components: (1) the size
of potentially affected population, (2) a baseline incidence rate for health effect
(obtained from a source of public health statistics such as CDC), (3)
concentration-response (C-R) function (derived from epidemiological studies),
and (4) estimated change in relevant pollutant concentration.
74. Id. at 5-16. Health valuation functions are based on assumption that a
dollar required to compensate a person for exposure to an adverse effect should
roughly be the same as a dollar a person is willing to pay to avoid that adverse
effect.
75. Id. at 5-24. Estimates imply 230,000 cases of avoided deaths, which can
be valued at $1.8 trillion in 2006 dollars. For more detail related to avoided
annual incidence of health effects and associated monetary valuation, see id. at
5-25, Table 5-6, Mean CAAA-Related Avoided Annual Incidence Of Health
Effects And Associated Monetary Valuation In 2000, 2010, and 2020.
76. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 7-2. At the same
time implying that a reduction in ambient PM particles is the driving force
behind majority of monetized benefits.
77. Id. at 7-7, Table 7-3, Present Value of Monetized Benefits of the
CAAA.
78. Estimates rely on particular sets of data, models and assumptions. It is
likely that other models, using other sets of data and assumptions would yield
different estimates of benefits and costs, but the assumptions and data used in
the models here can be easily justified.
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F. Uncertainty Analyses
The combination of the expected impact of the 1990 CAAA on
the economy, combined with the complexity of the Second
Prospective Study, requires care in addressing sources of
uncertainty in the key analytic outcomes of the study.79 With the
advice of the National Research Council,80 the Project Team
developed a three-step approach to address uncertainty in its
analysis:
1. Identify sources of uncertainty for each analytical step;
2. Quantify parameter and model uncertainty;81 and
3. Compare results of alternative analyses to the primary results.82
To identify important sources of uncertainty, a working
definition of a major uncertainty factor was developed.83 To be
considered major, an uncertainty factor had to meet two
conditions. First, a plausible alternative assumption or approach
would have to exist for this factor. Second, the factor would have
to have the potential to alter the overall estimates by five percent or
more.84
Several factors could affect direct cost estimates by a
significant percentage;85 however, as the authors assert, no cost
estimation uncertainty has the potential to double the current total
cost estimate of $65 billion or to reduce the cost estimate to $0 or
less,86 constituting the required magnitude of five percent of the

79. For further discussion on the characterization of the uncertainty surrounding
economic valuation, see generally Uncertainty Analyses to Support the Second
Section 812 Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Clean Air Act, INDUS. ECON. (2010), http:
/www.epa.gov/cleanairactbenefits/may10/IEc_Uncertainty.pdf, archived at http://per
a.cc/P2NS-KYH3 [hereinafter, Uncertainty Analyses].
80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS
OF PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS 146–48 (2002), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10511&page=126, archived at
http://perma.cc/38NX-A5HL.
81. Uncertainty modeling requires use of alternative assumptions and/or
models to re-estimate intermediate and/or overall net benefits results.
82. See, e.g., Uncertainty Analyses, supra note 79.
83. To be considered “major,” an expected impact of uncertainty was
assessed to be approximately $100 billion to affect net benefits estimates by as
much as five percent. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at
11-12.
84. Id. at 7-12.
85. Id. at 7-5. A good example of uncertainty involves estimating NAAQS
compliance, especially in the case when known emissions reduction measures
would not be sufficient to achieve full compliance with the standard in the
future.
86. Id. at 7-12.
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net benefit estimate.87 Conversely, there are several uncertainties
with the potential to affect benefits estimates88 that have an impact
of $100 billion or more.89 Examination of the sources of
uncertainty suggests limited ability to estimate the joint effect of
these factors on the direction of potential bias for net benefits.90
Interestingly though, 7 of 13 discussed factors listed in the analysis
have an indeterminate direction of effect.91 Such a large number of
factors with an indeterminate direction imply that the direction of
the net effect of all factors taken together remains unclear.
III. EXPANDING C-B ANALYSIS
The steps described above indicate a carefully constructed
analysis consistent with good C-B practices. As in any area of
inquiry, controversy abounds and experts argue about preferred
methodology.92 For example, putting a price on life raises ethical
issues. However, in a world of limited resources, it is best that
decision makers take into account alternatives to generate the best
value from the resources being directed and thereby avoid costly
rules that provide minimal benefit compared to more efficacious
alternatives.
A. Limits of C-B Analysis
Kip Viscusi, a professor of law, economics, and management,
compiled the estimated regulatory cost per life saved for assorted
regulations as of 1991 and showed that the cost per life “saved” by
some regulations ran into the trillions of dollars.93 If the goal is
efficient allocation of resources, the EPA and OSHA tend to
produce the worst bang for the buck, while home and highway
safety tend to be more cost-effective. Justice Breyer, prior to his

87. Id.
88. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 7-11. Examples
of such would involve forecasting errors, especially in regard to estimating
future economic and regulatory activity as well as estimating behavior under the
counterfactual without-CAAA scenario.
89. Id. at 7-12.
90. Id. at 7-11, Table 7-6 Potentially Major Sources of Uncertainty for
Estimating the Costs and Benefits of the CAAA.
91. Id.
92. To lay persons it may seem arcane, but, as discussed, a change of one
assumption can greatly affect the outcome of the analysis.
93. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 857 (2000).

238

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

Supreme Court appointment, wrote about such waste in regulation
citing Superfund as an example.94
Other problems that occur in economic valuation have been
explored. For example:
1. Measuring willingness to pay for safety measures is
extraordinarily difficult, as the wording of the question about a
risk will result in wide variations in value;95
2. The values people are alleged to place on knowing of the
existence of something, such as endangered species, are very
difficult to believe to be meaningful;96
3. Some real values have no logical price, such as “the
freedoms that people enjoy” that would be restricted by
regulation;97
4. Pricing the possible impact of actions today on future
generations is plausible,98 but once discount rates are applied to
events that may occur decades or centuries from now, the
uncertainty about changes in technology are taken into account,
and the likelihood of substantively criticized environmental
models being accurate is recognized, policy actions today that
cost more than a pittance are difficult to justify; and
5. Risk preferences and moral hazards are difficult to build into
cost-benefit calculations.99

94. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (Michael Aronson ed., 1993). Justice Breyer provided,
among other examples, a Superfund site where $9.3 million was spent “to
protect non-existent dirt-eating children.” Id. at 12.
95. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)
(providing an overview of perception biases based on information presentation).
See also RICHARD THALER, PRECOMMITMENT AND THE VALUE OF A LIFE 17–18
(1981) (providing an example in which the median value attached to avoiding a
specific risk changed from $800 to $100,000 depending on how the question
was phrased).
96. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy,
29 ENVTL. L. 765, 768 (1999). See also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1117 (2000).
97. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 931, 944 (2000).
98. John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
953, 954 (2000). To illustrate this principle, the example of global warming is
posed—what if we think there could be catastrophic events in 50 years for
actions taken today. Id. at 955.
99. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037 (2000) (discussing and providing examples of
these issues).
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B. Benefits of C-B Analysis
Despite acknowledged limitations, C-B analysis is commonly
employed. As Nobel laureate Gary Becker argues, it serves a
productive role “against misleading information spread by selfinterested political pressure groups” that lobby for economically
destructive activities or for limits on actions that may have net
benefits.100 This Article argues that some novel calculations now
included in C-B analysis threaten to make the analysis
meaningless, as they are increasingly driven by political values.
Before serving as administrator of OIRA in the first Obama
term, Professor Sunstein was enthusiastic about the use of C-B
analysis. Agencies are too responsive to populist ideas about risk
that may be disconnected from reality. Consequently, governments
often make “misinformed judgments” that squander lives and
money.101 He saw C-B analysis as a tool capable of going beyond
mundane accounting of relatively straightforward, generally
measurable costs and benefits to serving as a “spur to
regulation.”102 Fully formed C-B analysis could help people
overcome irrational fears and biases.
Next, a discussion on how C-B analysis has developed in
recent years, in part under Sunstein’s guidance. Sunstein employs
dubious measures of value to justify regulations that would be
unjustifiable if analysts stuck with best-known measures of
quantifiable costs and benefits based on market values and
scientific evidence.
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
As noted earlier, under the guidance of OIRA, agencies are
required to perform a C-B analysis of “economically significant”
regulations, meaning those estimated by the issuing agency to have
a cost equal to or greater than $100 million.103 In 2013, there were
100. Gary S. Becker, A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1149, 1152 (2000). Judge Posner agrees that C-B
analysis helps “to introduce market principles into government,” which he
thinks is sensible. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition,
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153,
1159 (2000).
101. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1059, 1063 (2000).
102. Id. at 1071.
103. 2013 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal
Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,
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224 such regulations in the pipeline, which constituted about five
percent of all rules under consideration.104
If the analysis shows a net benefit from a new rule, who can
object? For example, in 2013, OIRA asserted that from 2002 to
2012 the average annual cost of compliance with major federal
regulations was in the range of $57 billion to $84 billion. The
benefits were many times greater, running somewhere from $193
to $800 billion a year.105 That is, benefits were 3.4 to 14 times
greater than costs.
Overall, direct business compliance costs for environmental
regulations were estimated to be $183 billion in 2008, plus another
$98 billion, which was passed on to the non-business sector.106
Regulatory burdens typically fall hardest on manufacturing,
utilities, mining, and transportation—all energy intensive
sectors.107 Firms in these industries have more than triple the
compliance cost per worker than health sector workers.108 When
firms face significant burdens not faced by producers in other
countries, they tend to shift their operations to foreign locations to
reduce costs.
Next, this Article will review the effects of recent regulations
on both a small industry with a single product and a large industry
to illustrate how regulations directly impact the economy at
different levels. Additionally, this Article will look at how
associated costs are easily justified by asserting benefits to be
unusually high by historical standards. The basis for the high
benefits arises from the inclusion of non-market values.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET 10 (2013) [hereinafter, 2013 Draft Report to
Congress], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb
/inforeg/2013_cb/draft_2013_cost_benefit_report.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/8KR5-K774.
104. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN
ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 3 (2013).
105. 2013 Draft Report to Congress, supra note 103, at 3.
106. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY
COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 48 (2010). This estimate does not include the cost of
compliance with state regulations, which could “add to the nation’s total
regulatory compliance burden.” Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 40 (citing Michael Hazilla & Raymond Kopp, The Social Cost of
Environmental Quality Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 858 (1990)).
108. Id. at 51–52.
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A. Impact on a Small Industry: Cement
Cement manufacturing in the United States directly employs
about 12,000 people, and sales of domestically produced cement
were about $6.6 billion in 2011.109 Domestic cement use averages
about 100 million metric tons per year.110 When demand runs high,
imports fill the gap. The United States is a small player in the
world market, accounting for about two percent of global
production.111 Not surprisingly, China dominates with more than
half of global production, however, cement is made virtually
everywhere as the inputs are common and transportation costs are
substantial.
Hazardous emissions from Portland cement production are
regulated under Subpart LLL of the National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), within the Clean Air
Act.112 Recently, the EPA issued a new maximum achievable
control technology (MACT) standard to apply to all kilns in the
country.113 The new “floor” standard for emissions is equal to the
emission reduction already achieved “by the best performing 12
percent of the existing sources.”114 This standard applies to all
existing facilities. New facilities would have to meet a more
stringent New Source Performance Standard (NSPS), which is
considered to be “the best system of emission reduction” the EPA
identifies.115 New plants would cost an estimated $600 million
each, thereby driving up the cost of domestic production. As
producers in China and other countries need not comply with
costly regulations imposed on United States producers, buyers are
likely to increasingly favor less costly imports.116
109. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES
2012 38 (2012), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2012
/mcs2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L4Q4-N5PY.
110. See id. Consumption dropped between 2007 and 2011 to about 70
million tons due to the economic slowdown. See id.
111. Id. at 39.
112. Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. § 63.1340 (2014).
113. The new rule, as it affects cement, was proposed in 2009 and published
in 2010 with various compliance dates through 2014. The industry sued to block
the rule, while environmental groups demanded more. Essentially, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the EPA position. See generally
Portland Cement Ass’n. v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (2011).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2012).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
116. Market Intelligence, PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOC. 6 (Apr. 29, 2013) (on
file with author). For a general discussion of the impact of the NESHAP rule,
see Bernard L. Weinstein, Economic Impacts of Cement Industry Regulations:
The Proposed Portland Cement NESHAP Rule, SMU COX MAGUIRE ENERGY
INST., (Feb. 2010), http://www.cox.smu.edu/c/document _library/get_file?p_l_id
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In its C-B analysis, the EPA asserted that annualized
compliance costs for existing facilities to meet MACT would be
$368 million (2005 dollars). Consequently, 8% of domestic cement
industry jobs would be lost,117 average firm revenues would fall by
4%, domestic production would fall 8%, imports would increase
by two million metric tons, some small plants would close, the
price of domestic cement would rise 4%, and domestic industry net
revenue would decline by 16%.118 The EPA estimated social costs
to total $605 million, about two-thirds of which would be borne by
cement users as a result of higher prices (a loss of consumer
surplus) and one-third would result from losses suffered by
domestic producers (a loss of producer surplus).119
However, the EPA estimated that the total costs would be
offset by the benefits which, when fully implemented, would total
between $4.4 and $11 billion (at a three percent discount rate),
yielding a net benefit between $3.7 and $11 billion.120 The benefits
would result from a decline in mortality and morbidity from a
reduction in PM2.5 and SO2.121 Why is there such a large range in
estimated benefits? The lower and higher estimates are based on
different models of health impacts. The lower bound estimate is
derived from a nine-page 2002 study (the Pope study); the higher
bound is derived from a five-page 2006 study (the Laden study).122

=68463&folderId=229433&name=DLFE-3104.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/S2UA-8Q7Z.
117. This estimate may be low, as employment fell more than 8% between 2009
and 2011 after having already fallen 20% the previous year when construction
dropped in the recession. Payroll similarly declined. As construction was no longer
in decline by 2011, the decline may be due to implementation of the rule. See 2011
Annual Survey of Manufactures, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ASM_2011_31GS101&prodT
ype=table, archived at http://perma.cc/PY6A-RSBQ. See also 2009 Annual Survey
of Manufacturers, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/table
services/jsf/pages/product view.xhtml?pid=ASM_2009_31GS101&prodType=table,
archived at http://perma.cc/78RM-ZT5D .
118. Regulatory Impact Analysis: National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry,
Final Report, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY 1-1 (Apr. 2009), [hereinafter, Regulatory
Impact Analysis], http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/portlandcementria
_4-20-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U8PY-3RPZ .
119. Id. at 3-13.
120. Id. at 1-2. Given the cost discussion, the final $11 billion figure should
probably be $10 billion.
121. Id. at 5-1.
122. Id. (referring to Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air
Pollution and Mortality, 173 AM, J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667
(2006) and C. Arden Pope, Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and
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Even assuming these estimates represent the best available
research, it is problematic for decisions of such magnitude to be
based on hypothetical values derived from two limited studies.123
Small changes in the assumptions could shift the benefits to be
below the cost estimates or even greater than the higher bound
benefit estimate reported.
One consequence of the more costly regulation of United
States cement production is that foreign producers may gain a
larger share of the United States market.124 As in many other
industries, the market share for imports rises as domestic capital
costs are forced up by rules that do not apply to cement producers
in China and other countries, which are happy to sell into the
United States market.125 Thus, one predictable result of the EPA’s
imposition of additional costs on United States producers is that
United States consumers will purchase more foreign cement that
has a greater negative impact on air quality than domestically
produced cement.
The EPA’s environmental analysis fails to include the
environmental cost of moving production to China and other
countries. This seems peculiar given the focus on the benefit of
reduction in emissions. Cement delivered from China is estimated
to produce 25% higher CO2 emissions than for the same quantity
of cement produced in the United States. A Department of Energy
(DOE) report concurred that Chinese cement production produces
more emissions than current production methods in the United
States.126 While, as discussed below, the cost of carbon is now
routinely included in the cost of emissions, the fact that higher
levels of emissions go into the atmosphere when production shifts
from the United States to foreign sources was not taken into
account.
Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1132 (2002)).
123. A choice must be made when using a number in such calculations, but
choices of work not representative of existing research can substantially skew
the final result one way or another. See generally SUSAN DUDLEY, Perpetuating
Puffery: An Analysis of the Composition of OMB’s Reported Benefits of
Regulation, 45 BUS. ECON. 165 (2012) (former OIRA Administrator Susan
Dudley critiquing assumptions being made in the Obama OIRA).
124. The EPA estimates importers will gain a net $89 million. See
Regulatory Impact Analysis, supra note 118, at 3-13.
125. For a discussion, see Weinstein, supra note 116.
126. For a discussion, see Ragnar Lofstedt, EPA’s Proposed NESHAP for
Portland Cement: Ignoring the Risk-Risk Tradeoff 11 (2010), https://cement.org
/newsroom/Kings_College/Kings_College_Study.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/Z3LE-YUR8.
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In the EPA’s view, as properly “proven” by the cost-benefit
analysis required by Congress, the national economy has improved
by as much as $10 billion per year, despite shrinkage of the
domestic industry in favor of increased imports and the loss of
domestic producer and consumer surplus. Applying that value to
the future cement industry, the EPA claims to have increased the
real value of the industry from about $10 billion a year to $20
billion a year despite the loss of profits and production. National
income accounting is not done by adding imputed or asserted
values, such as dollars for tons of CO2 emitted or not emitted;
nevertheless, the EPA and other agencies apply a cost-benefit
analysis by placing dollar values on things not measured in the
economy, such as the imputed value of carbon not emitted.127
B. Impact on a Common Product: Microwave Ovens
Many companies make microwave ovens. In 1967 the Amana
Radarange sold for $495.128 Despite being condemned as unsafe by
Consumer Reports, they were popular and sales grew rapidly.129
Competition and technical improvements brought the price down,
so a product once thought to be only for the relatively wealthy is
now available to virtually everyone. While today small models can
be bought for around $60, this price will increase.
In 2014, the DOE issued the “Energy Conservation Program:
Energy Conservation Standards for Standby Mode and Off Mode
for Microwave Ovens.”130 The DOE asserts that over the 30-year
life of the rule—2016 to 2045—it will produce benefits of up to
$3.38 billion (using a 3% discount rate).131 The corresponding cost
to the microwave industry will be only $96.6 million, which means
the regulation will produce 35 times more economic benefits than
costs.132
The cost estimate is relatively straightforward. Microwave
ovens will be more expensive when they are retooled to consume
less power while not in use. DOE estimates manufacturers will
lose about seven percent of their net industry value due to higher
127. See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Standby Mode and Off Mode for Microwave Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg.
36,316 (June 17, 2013).
128. See Amana Radar Range (1967), IDSA, http://www.idsa.org/amanaradarange-1967, archived at http://perma.cc/TTS9-UP3Y.
129. See STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES 115
(1994).
130. 78 Fed. Reg. 36,316.
131. Id. at 36,317.
132. Id.
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costs and lost sales (the $96.6 million).133 According to the DOE,
however, that loss in industry value is swamped by the benefits.
Over 30 years, microwave users will use less electricity, translating
into 38.11 million metric tons less of CO2 being emitted.134 While
other emissions will also drop, a decline in other emissions is not
where DOE sees the primary value.
Herein lies the economic problem that impacts the validity of
the C-B analysis. There is no price for CO2. It is clear that CO2
emissions occur, but whether they are a problem is subject to
debate.135 Assigning a price to a ton of CO2 gives an economic
fiction legal credibility, and thereby has major impact.136 By
assigning a “price” to tons of carbon, the C-B analysis assumes
that the value of carbon not emitted is far greater than the cost of
injury to an industry and consumers.
C. Impact on a Large Industry: Electricity
Coal produced half of the United States’ electricity in 2005, but
now only produces about 40%.137 This change is largely driven by
the EPA’s decision to impose stringent regulations that will drive
down coal use, largely in favor of natural gas.138 Emissions are
subject to tightening regulations, and the process seems largely

133. Id.
134. Id. at 36,317–18.
135. We express no opinion about the environmental impact of CO2. The
science on the matter is uncertain. For some research that points in another
direction and illustrates the basic uncertainties about the matter, see, e.g., Global
Warming Caused by CFCs, Not Carbon Dioxide, Researcher Claims in
Controversial Study, SCIENCE DAILY (May 30, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily
.com/releases/2013/05/130530132443.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NZ3WKRYS.
136. Even if one believes carbon loading in the atmosphere, which is
occurring, is a serious matter, that does not address the issue that there is no
price for carbon. Whether or not it should be subject to regulation is a policy and
legal issue not addressed by the market or prices generated in the market.
137. The figure fell under 40% in 2012 but bounced back up in 2013, but the
large drop in coal use is not likely to be reversed. See Coal regains some electric
generation market share from natural gas, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 23,
1013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11391, archived at http:
//perma.cc/9TC3-PHXU.
138. See, e.g., Aaron Larson, The Coal to Gas Exodus Continues, POWER
(Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.powermag.com/the-coal-to-gas-exodus-continues
/?hq_e=el&hq_m=2819287&hq_l=3&hq_v=87613213c8, archived at http:
//perma.cc/Y266-ZPYS.
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driven by concerns over coal’s contributions to greenhouse gas
emissions that may relate to climate change.139
A recent major rule in this regard is the Utility MACT Rule,
also known as the Mercury and Air Toxic Standards (MATS),
which was finalized by the EPA at the end of 2011 and updated in
2013.140 This rule applies mainly to plants burning coal to generate
electricity (very little oil is burned to generate electricity, but the
rule applies to such facilities also). Coal-fuel electric generating
units must meet the new control standard by 2015.
What are the costs and benefits of the Utility MACT Rule? The
EPA estimates the annual compliance cost, in 2007 dollars, to be
$9.6 billion by 2015.141 Using the EPA and the Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) assumptions, National Economic Research
Associates (NERA), a consulting firm employed by the coal
industry, estimates annual compliance costs of $10.4 billion in
2010 dollars, or about $9.9 billion in 2007 dollars, and total
compliance costs of $94.8 billion.142 The difference in the cost
estimates is relatively small, which is an indication that the EPA
did quality work on that side of the equation, as it is not much
contested by industry. The costs are significant, but there is little
dispute about how large the costs are. To put into perspective what
this $10 billion per year rule means in practice, it will result in coal
plant closings affecting 23,000 MegaWatts (MWs) of electricity
production and job losses of 180,000 to 215,000 by 2015.143
While the cost to implement the rule is about $10 billion per
year, the EPA reports that the “annual monetized benefits (in
2007$ [sic]) [will be] between $37 to $90 billion using a 3%
139. Again, we are not qualified to make a pronouncement on climate
change, but note the substantial skepticism about the presumed mechanism and
threat posed by greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, What to Make
of a Warming Plateau, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at D3; Matt Ridley, Mind &
Matter: Science Is About Evidence, Not Consensus, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2013, at
C2.
140. Reconsideration of Certain New Sources Issues, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,073
(2013).
141. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS ES-1 (2011) [hereinafter MERCURY AND
AIR TOXICS STANDARDS], available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo
38996/20111221MATSfinalRIA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VLP7-Q42C.
142. Major EPA Regulations Affecting Coal-Fueled Electricity, AM. COAL. FOR
CLEAN COAL ELEC. 1 (Aug. 2012), http://americaspower.org/sites/default /files/mayissues-policies/EPA-Regulations-August-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6Y
F7-E75E.
143. Anne E. Smith et al., An Economic Impact Analysis of EPA’s Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards Rule, NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOC. 5 (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB _MATS_Rule
_0312.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CT2F-J39W.
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discount rate . . . .”144 The EPA asserts that the benefits are not
theoretical, rather, the agency asserts that the benefits are
“monetized,” meaning that they will show up in measured higher
GDP. Since GDP is about $16 trillion, the impact of this one rule is
asserted to add about a half a percent of GDP.145 The benefit will
not go directly to the utility companies—they will incur higher
costs and lower profits—but the economy at large will benefit.
Outside of Ponzi schemes, one cannot find investments promising
to deliver a rate of return of between 370% and 900%, year after
year.
Compounding the difficulty of doing standard cost and benefit
estimation is the impact of the EPA’s “environmental justice”
program.146 The EPA wants emission impacts estimated for
various minority populations.147 In 2011, the Utility MACT Rule
looked at the impact of reductions in mercury emissions on Laotian
fishermen and Chippewa Indians, among other racial and ethnic
groups, for the year 2016.148 While such group-specific studies
raise the cost of analysis, they need not skew the gross value of the
benefits of a particular rule, however, this is not the case with the
presumption of monetization of carbon emissions.
D. Carbon Pricing and the War on Coal via Cost-Benefit Analysis
The Utility MACT Rule is only one of a number of rules in
place or under development that are primarily aimed at coal-fueled
utilities. Looking at seven rules implemented or under
consideration by the EPA, and using the EPA and EIA’s
assumptions, analysts for the coal industry estimate that over 20
years, the total implementation cost in the electricity industry will
be about $200 billion.149 Depending on the specific assumptions,
the estimated number of jobs lost will be between 544,000 and
144. MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, supra note 141, at ES-1.
145. Id.
146. For an overview of various elements, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN
EJ 2014 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources
/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-2011-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QGT4KHNP.
147. For a general discussion of how such measures will become a routine
part of C-B analysis, see Draft Technical Guidance for Assessing Environmental
Justice in Regulatory Analysis, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2013), http://Yosemite
.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/0F7D1A0D7D15001B8525783000673AC3/$File/
EPA-HQ-OA-2013-0320-0002[1].pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CX7F-M5DP.
148. Id. at 7-48 and 7-49 respectively.
149. For a summary, see Impacts of Seven EPA Rules, AM. COAL. FOR
CLEAN COAL ELEC. (2012), http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files
/NERA-3.0-Impacts-Oct26.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K57H-J829.
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887,000, and much of that will be in the upper Midwest and
Mississippi valley where the use of coal-fired power plants is
common.150 Total loss of existing electricity facilities will be
between 54,000 and 69,000 MWs—about 1.5% of total United
States capacity.151
Some existing facilities will be decommissioned, a costly
process in itself, and capital investments must be made that will
result in higher operating costs for existing facilities. For example,
new natural-gas-fueled facilities will be built to replace functional
coal-fueled plants. Crucially, these are not capital expenditures by
firms that have independently determined that the investments are
worthwhile based on economic considerations of rates of return,
but instead, the expenditures are forced by regulators. Capital is
consumed, meaning less is available for other economic uses. The
net result is continued supply of electricity at higher cost to utility
operators and electricity users.
The NSPS proposed by the EPA in 2012 will likely ensure that
new coal-fueled plants will not be built. The standards are intended
to control CO2 emissions from new fossil-fuel-fired power plants
by forcing a preference for natural gas.152 The industry has
reported that the new standards mean no new coal-fired plants can
be built. At this time, the only feasible way to meet the standards is
to use carbon capture technology.153 This technology is being
tested at a plant in Mississippi.154 However, as often happens with
new technology, there have been cost overruns and multiple
problems, so it is uncertain when the technology could be cost
effective or even capable of being put into practice.155 In early
2014, the DOE announced the reinvigoration of a stalled carbon
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Withdrawal of Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79
Fed. Reg. 1,352, 1,352–53 (Jan. 8, 2014). EPA stalled implementation, perhaps
in due to pressure from unhappy members of Congress. See Justin Martino, EPA
delays finalizing New Source Performance Standard regulations, POWER
ENGR. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2013/04/epadelays-finalizing-new-source-performance-standard-regulation.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/E2YW-2BAG.
153. The rule is expected to be finalized. See Major EPA Regulations
Affecting Coal-Fueled Electricity, supra note 142, at 4–5.
154. For an ongoing review of the multi-billion dollar project, see Kemper
County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project,
CARBON CAPTURE & SEQUESTRATION TECHNOLOGIES @ MIT, https://seques
tration.mit.edu/tools/projects/kemper.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KX42GMVU (last updated Sept. 15, 2015).
155. Rebecca Smith, Southern Co. to Take $540 Million Charge For Kemper
Plant, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2013, at B4.
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capture project in Illinois.156 While carbon capture technology may
become cost effective, the industry literature does not indicate that
this is expected any time soon.
The EPA asserts the NSPS rule will have no net economic
impact because the cost advantage of natural gas means that it is
likely to replace coal even without the rule. Substituting natural
gas for coal is environmentally beneficial157 because natural gas
emits only a tiny fraction of the SO2 and NOX emitted by coal, and
only about half the CO2 emitted by coal, to generate the same
power.158 Hence, the major justification for the rule is reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. A variety of prices are attached to each
ton of emissions, but the benefit of damage prevented by burning
natural gas rather than coal is presumed to be about $50 per MW
hour.159 However, in making this presumption the EPA failed to
take the final step of estimating the value of the benefit of phasing
out coal in favor of natural gas, which is the purpose of the NSPS
rule. Assuming electricity use remains at about 3.75 billion MWs,
and 40% of that number is generated from coal, then 1.5 billion
MWs will be converted. Because the EPA calculation provides that
the benefit of burning natural gas instead of coal is roughly $50 per
MW, the total value of the 1.5 billion MWs converted from coal is
$75 billion. This sum adds about a half percent to GDP and, best of
all, allegedly costs nothing.
V. WE ARE THE WORLD?
Carbon cost is calculated in regulatory analysis not just for its
assumed future impact on the United States, but also for its future
impact on the world. Consider the DOE’s energy conservation

156. See Mark Drajem, Stalled Carbon-Capture Project Nears Construction
with U.S. Aid, B LOOMBERG B USINESSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-16/stalled-carbon-capture-project-nearsconstruction-with-u-dot-s-dot-aid, archived at http://perma.cc/KV3R-UTTV.
157. AMANDA CURRY BROWN, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE
PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS ES-3
(Mar. 2012), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo23756/20120327
proposalRIA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JC32-T4EC.
158. Id. at 5-21, Table 5-5 Illustrative Emissions Profiles, New Coal and
Natural Gas-Fired Generating Units.
159. Id. at 5-30, Table 5-7 Pollution Damages ($/MWh) from Illustrative
New Coal Unit Relative to New Natural Gas Combined Cycle Unit. This is at a
three percent discount rate and does not include possible benefits by reductions
in pollutants such as mercury and arsenic, so it could be a conservative estimate.

250

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

standards for residential furnace fans.160 The DOE estimates that
the industry net present value (INPV) of the market for residential
furnace fans is a quarter-billion dollars and “manufacturers may
lose up to 21.6% of their INPV, which is approximately $54.4
million.”161 In exchange, consumers will, assuming a similar
discount rate, save $11.6 billion in exchange for $3.1 billion in
higher costs at the time of installation.162 The rule meets a standard
C-B test, however, the benefit is asserted to be even better. At a
discount rate of seven percent, the economic value of the
environmental benefit from reduced CO2 and NOX is asserted to be
$20.1 billion.163 That number can be much smaller or larger
depending on the discount rate chosen as well as the per-ton value
placed on the emissions.
The social cost of carbon (SCC) “is an estimate of the
monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in
carbon emissions in a given year. It is intended to include . . .
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem
services.”164 This measure includes both a domestic value and a
global value. The global value is the one employed in C-B
analyses. The residential heating fan rule discussion notes that the
Department of Transportation (DOT) used a domestic SCC value
of $2 per metric ton of CO2 and a global SCC value of $33 per ton
in the 2011 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rule.165
What value to use depends on many assumptions, including how
far out in time and what discount rate.
In its microwave oven rule, the DOE relied on an interagency
agreement from 2010 in which the SCC was calculated. As the
DOE notes, a ton of carbon is valued at $15.7 in 2050 if using a
5% discount rate, at $65 if using a 2.5% discount rate, and at
$136.2 if using a 3% discount rate, but this assumes the 95th
percentile worst-case projection of climate change under assorted
models from the IPCC.166 The vague authority to adopt such
160. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Standards for
Residential Furnace Fans, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,068 (Oct. 25, 2013).
161. Id. at 64,070.
162. Id. at 64,071. That calculation assumes a seven percent discount rate. At
a three percent discount rate the cost rises to $5.8 billion but the savings rise to
$32 billion. See Table 1.3.
163. Id. At a discount rate of three percent the benefit would be $38 billion.
164. Id. at 64,106.
165. 78 Fed. Reg. at 64,107.
166. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON,
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 1 (2010) [hereinafter,
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP.], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
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numbers is drawn from Executive Order 12866 of 1993, which
uses the “best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical,
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and
consequences of, the intended regulation.”167 Hence, the IPCC
estimates are drawn upon for scientific expertise. Assertions of the
IPCC are then used as the basis for a panel of experts to divine a
price to be assigned today to carbon emissions that may have an
impact decades in the future. Climate change is asserted to be a
“global externality,”168 so the cost of emissions should be
estimated globally.169 The United States contains only a tiny
fraction of the world population, so the domestic value of reduced
emissions is much smaller than the global value.170
The SCC is the source of benefits from reduced CO2 emissions.
According to the DOE’s calculations concerning microwave ovens,
this is worth as much as $3.615 billion, and at a minimum it is
worth $255 million, which is much higher than the regulation’s
cost under the most conservative assumption. However, the large
number attributed to the SCC almost entirely drives this result. The
benefit of a ton of CO2 not emitted is predicted to be somewhere
between $12.6 and $119.1 per ton, up substantially from the 2010
SCC values of only $6.2 to $78.4 per ton. In particular, the DOE
doubled the lower bound of the estimate, which placed more
regulations in the black.
The “value” of CO2 non-emissions is based on nothing other
than the imagination of bureaucrats and advocates of carbon
pricing. There is no real market for such emissions. The price,

/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/9DG8-LJKW. In general, those who think climate
change a serious threat wish to use low discount rates. The value in 100 years of
$1,000 spent today assuming a 1% discount rate is $367; using a 7% discount
rate yields less than $1 in benefits a century from now. See Maureen Cropper,
How Should Benefits & Costs Be Discounted in an Intergenerational Context?
183 RESOURCES 2013, http://www.rff.org/Publications/Resources/Pages/183Benefits-and-Costs-in-Intergenerational-Context.aspx, archived at http://perma
.cc//T724-CGWX.
167. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R 569 (1994).
168. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP., supra note 166, at 10.
169. Recall that, curiously, there was no consideration given to the increased
carbon emission from increased cement production outside of the United States
for cement likely to be sold to the United States after domestic production falls
due to the rule.
170. The report notes that, rather than population, one could base the
distribution of benefits as a share of world GDP, in which case the United States
would capture about 23% of the benefit of reduced emissions rather than 7%10%. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP., supra note 166, at 11.
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whether $12.6 or $119.1 per ton, exists only in the minds of those
“interagency process” participants who speculate about the matter.
The only place a so-called “market” for carbon exists is in the
European Union, where carbon emissions are traded due to
regulatory fiat. The carbon price has gyrated; it was $13 a ton in
early 2013,171 but fell to less than half that by early 2014.172
Asserting a definitive price for carbon as the basis for detailed
federal policy-making that imposes hundred of billions in cost is
akin to the Pentagon, the NSA, and Homeland Security
announcing that the value to every American to be free of terrorists
and foreign invasion is $2,000 to $20,000 per year per American,
and then employing this value in determining military budget and
planning. Pick your number. While Americans wish to be free of
terrorist threats, it is traditionally not up to agency bureaucrats to
determine the economic value of services, including national
defense, which will be paid for by the private sector.
A. Social Planning through Cost-Benefit
In Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review, President Obama instructed agencies to take
into account nearly every imaginable value when doing C-B
analysis. Agencies must include “values that are difficult or
impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness,
and distributive impacts.”173 This has opened the barn door to
throwing in any value, real or imagined, that may be asserted by
any advocacy group in the calculation of benefits from regulations.

171. The price had been higher in Europe, but has been falling as the carbontrading program in the EU appears to be failing. See Mathew Carr, EU Carbon
Price Expectations Plunge 47% in a Year, IETA Says, BLOOMBERG (May 28,
2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-28/eu-carbon-priceexpectations-plunge-47-in-a-year-ieta-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/UZU7-NDFJ. The State of California has run some carbon auctions for limited
purposes and the price is similar to that in Europe. See Additional Auction 1 and
2 Summary Statistics, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.arb.ca.gov
/cc/capandtrade/auction/additionalauction1and2summarystatistics.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/QHX9-4PXP (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
172. The price was 3.71 Euros in late March 2014, which was about $5. See
James Murray, EU Carbon Price Rides the “Rollercoaster” as Emissions Fall,
BUSINESSGREEN (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis
/2337543/eu-carbon-price-rides-the-rollercoaster-as-emissions-fall, archived at
http://perma.cc/P8JT-4JTZ.
173. Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order 13563, 76
Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
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Human dignity has real value but no price, and fairness and equity
are elusive concepts subject to endless exploitation.174
Despite the fact that these values allow for endless speculation
and exploitation, Cass Sunstein celebrates their inclusion in C-B
analysis.175 He gives examples such as a ban on discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, and easier bathroom access for
employees in wheelchairs.176 Logically, would such rules be based
on fairness, human dignity, or equity? Sunstein says the former is
an example of fairness and the latter is an example of dignity. For
the same examples, call the former an example of dignity and the
latter an example of fairness. Does it change the value of either?
Philosophers may have thoughts about such matters, and such rules
may strike us generally as the right thing to do, but that does not
mean they have a logical part in a C-B analysis.
Similarly, Sunstein asserts that a value can be calculated for a
regulation that may help reduce the likelihood of rape, and the fact
of human dignity should be put into the calculation.177 Do the
mental exercise: what amount of money would you pay to prevent
your daughter from being raped? Thugs in another room will rape
her unless you pay. Most people would empty their bank accounts
to prevent such a thing. These are not market transactions
susceptible of being priced. Criminal laws, and to a lesser extent,
tort laws, are how civilized societies deal with such matters; there
are no relevant market prices. Thus, to assign prices makes all of
policy a utilitarian exercise.
The war in Iraq may have cost a trillion dollars. Was it worth
it? Such things are public policy decisions largely based on nonmarket values.178 Political struggles ensue; costs and benefits can
be asserted but cannot be scientifically calculated for policy
matters that evolve as events proceed. Suppose Hitler had offered
to sign an enforceable non-aggression treaty with the United
States, so long as the United States allowed the Third Reich to
continue its domination of Europe. It would not be hard to
construct a C-B analysis to justify such a peace, especially if only
174. A century ago, the Federal Trade Commission was ordered to attack
“unfair” business practices. The agency generally ignored that part of the statute,
preferring to focus on deceptive acts, as it is easier to agree on a legally
operational meaning of that term compared to the vague “unfair.”
175. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Market considerations no doubt matter. Iraq may have been of special
concern due to its oil, as was the case with Kuwait previously. Government
instability and slaughters in Rwanda, the Congo, and other places result in little
more than head shaking.
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the values of residents of the United States mattered. Adding
Holocaust victim values into the mix changes the calculus.
Unlike war and rape, there are other serious matters, such as
starvation, that are well addressed by markets. How much would
you pay not to starve or, less selfishly, not let your child starve?
We address that problem through the market. Refusal to buy any
food may result in voluntarily starvation, but food markets
ordinarily work quite well, so the prices are relied on to help sort
out the issue with little thought. Unfortunate people in barbarous
countries do face starvation at various times, but such events are
often caused by disastrous government policies that spur food
shortages. Even if it is understood that bad government policies
caused the food shortage, the “solution” of the moment is often to
hand over food to thugs who control a country and hope for a
better government.179
Even if they can be recognized as noble goals, adding values
such as dignity and equity into C-B analysis cannot be justified as
good economics. Economists are not that smart. They cannot
predict stock prices tomorrow, let alone values of fairness.180
Taking C-B analysis to the level endorsed by Sunstein and
increasingly employed by the Obama administration is central
planning in new, more scientific-appearing clothes.181 Some
prominent economists hail Sunstein’s declarations, which is not
179. There has been much debate about the wisdom of giving food to North
Korea, which we know is a source of revenue for the dreadful regime there, but
it still strikes many as the best alternative. Costs and benefits can be argued but
not sensibly calculated. Even democratic regimes, such as India, can engage in
food policies that provide more food for corrupt bureaucrats than for the poor
who are supposed to be helped. See, e.g., Raymond Zhong & Vibhuti Agarwal,
Modi’s U.S. Visit Fails to Resolve Food Subsidy Dispute, WALL ST. J. INDIA
(Oct. 2, 2014, 10:26 AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2014/10/02/modisu-s-visit-fails-to-resolve-food-subsidy-dispute/, archived at http://perma.cc
/A2UK-A2XQ .
180. Economists did not foresee the forthcoming financial collapse in 2008.
Even those who gained fame from “predicting” the forthcoming problem may
have simply been lucky. Ask enough experts about tomorrow and some will
randomly be right. Similarly, efforts to predict inflation are similarly flawed
despite the intellectual and computer firepower devoted to such efforts. See
James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Inflation Forecasting, 12 NBER REPORTER
13 (2012).
181. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were serious debates for
decades about the wisdom on having central authorities control production,
wages and prices. Even those who disdained the brutality of Stalinism argued
that well-informed authorities, especially economists, could guide an economy
to prosperity. Some argued for near-total controls, others advocated a more
limited degree of central control. See, e.g., Stanislaw Wellisz & Ronald Findlay,
Central Planning and the ‘Second Economy’ in Soviet-Type Systems, 96 ECON.
J. 646, 646 (1986).
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surprising.182 Personal, intellectual, and financial self-interest
drives members of a profession to be more highly valued and is
part of the process that guides society.183
The rule of law has traditionally been sensible about such
matters. Carelessly running a red light, plowing into another car,
and killing a person results in a tort suit if solvent, possible
criminal charges aside. Compensatory damages will equal the
value of the life taken. The damages are largely based on the
expected economic value of the life lost; a smart young doctor of
30 is worth a lot more than a smart retired doctor of 85. Sums will
be added in for other values, it is the best society can do. Such
proceedings are rather cruelly technical as experts argue over the
value of the life lost. The fact that the taking of the life was unfair
does not change the matter. The family members who have
suffered the loss would refuse to put a price tag on it, however,
they will see a price tag assigned. Such matters can be addressed
with rough justice through use of market values.
To assert that regulators should assign values to fairness and
dignity is fundamentally flawed if one believes that markets work
under a rule of law. Thomas Sowell summarizes this in his book A
Conflict of Visions.184 There are two fundamental tribes of
thinkers.185 One tribe has what Sowell calls a constrained vision
that relies on limited government and markets. The other tribe has
an unconstrained vision of a world in which there can be rational
planning to promote human perfectibility. No doubt Sunstein
belongs to the latter tribe and is genuine in his pursuit of carefully
crafted regulations that account for a multiplicity of values. James
M. Buchanan, a Nobel laureate in economics, viewed the power of
economics and the role of economists from the other side, as the
title of his autobiography, Better than Plowing, attests.186
Economists and other analysts are no smarter than farmers; they
just do not work as hard.
182. According to the quotes that appear on the book jacket.
183. Difficult issues such as hedonic values continue to undergo refinement
and, no doubt, improve, the problems are rife in in such generally accepted
methodology. For mention of recent work, see V. Kerry Smith, Is
Environmental Quality Worth the Cost?, 11 NBER REPORTER 14, 14 (2011).
184. See THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES (2007).
185. In economics this is an ever-present issue that goes back many decades.
Can economic planners do better than a market economy under a rule of law?
See, e.g., Daniel Shapiro, Reviving the Socialist Calculation Debate: A Defense
of Hayek Against Lange, 6 SOC. PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 139 (1989).
186. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, BETTER THAN PLOWING AND OTHER
PERSONAL ESSAYS (1992).
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CONCLUSION
In Simpler: The Future of Government187 Professor Sunstein
reflects on his years in the Obama Administration as Administrator
of the OIRA. He explains how an application of behavioral
economics to regulation allows the development of more
sophisticated, effective regulation, which avoids the pitfalls of
brute regulations that may have good intentions but are often
poorly executed.188 The resulting rules can produce greater benefits
at lower cost.
Some examples seem curious. He discusses the ban of
Primatene Mist in 2011. It was “the only over-the-counter asthma
medicine” available,189 but its propellant was a CFC banned under
the Montreal Protocol.190 When the forthcoming ban was
announced in 2008, it was presumed that a substitute propellant
would be available by 2011, however, no new propellant came into
existence. Thus, it had to be decided whether Primatine Mist would
still be marketed despite the ban called for by the Protocol.
Sunstein explains that Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulators had to wrestle with the tradeoff between environmental
damage from the CFCs emitted by Primatene Mist and the health
benefits to those who used the product.191 It was the only over-thecounter product and was much cheaper than alternatives requiring
prescriptions.192 As some asthma sufferers did not have regular
health care, access to alternatives was even more difficult and
costly.193 The FDA wrestled with these costs and benefits, it knew
that banning the product would result in more hospitalizations and
could result in significant costs.194 Ultimately, the FDA decided
not to extend the life of the product because “asthma sufferers
would do better to find doctors and to use the prescription
medicine that really was right for them.”195 How this differs from
old-style brute regulation is unclear, but Sunstein asserts that being

187. SUNSTEIN, supra note 175.
188. See id. at Ch. 2.
189. Id. at 154.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 155.
192. Id. at 155.
193. SUNSTEIN, supra note 175, at 155.
194. Cass R. Sunstein, The Ozone Treaty that Banned Your Asthma Inhaler,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-1022/the-ozone-treaty-that-banned-your-asthma-inhaler.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/RRC7-N3RY.
195. SUNSTEIN, supra note 175, at 155.
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more scientific about C-B analysis is “a little like a plea for sense
rather than nonsense.”196
The key point is that by adding a fictional “market” value for
CO2 non-emissions to the benefits of assorted environmental
regulations, the total alleged benefits of the regulations are pushed
to astronomical levels. As discussed previously, in 2011, the EPA
published a summary of the benefits of the Clean Air Act of
1990.197 By 2010, the Act was asserted to impose annual costs of
about $50 billion, but yield benefits of about $1.3 trillion per
year—a wonderful 26-1 benefit to cost ratio.198 Hence, about nine
percent of the GDP is attributed to one statute and its attendant
regulations. Those alleged benefits do not include CO2 reductions,
which, as just discussed, drive benefits to even higher levels. If
regulatory control by agencies continues to march forward using
the advanced cost-benefit process that Sunstein helped enshrine at
the OIRA, many claim that GDP will rise significantly. This
remains to be seen, and there will be a market test of the
beneficence of the latest variation of scientific central planning.

196. Id. at 5.
197. See supra Part II. A.
198. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 3-9.

